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COMMENTS

CALIFORNIA ORAL WILL CONTRACTS: THE
DECLINE OF TESTATOR INTENT IN THE

SHADOW OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

I. INTRODUCTION

Under California law, a person is free to enter into contractual agreements that either require her to make particular testamentary dispositions of property or that restrict
or eliminate her ability to revoke an already existing will.'
Although California law on this subject is historically doctrinal, the California legislature, in 1983,2 enacted section
150 of the Probate Code.' Section 150 retained the spirit of
the common law, including, most importantly, the requirement that all contracts to make or not to revoke a will be in
writing and signed by the testator.4
1. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (West 1998); see also Morrison v. Land, 147
P. 259, 261 (Cal. 1915).
2. Although section 150 was adopted by the California legislature in 1983,
it did not become effective until January 1, 1985. See infra note 3.
3. Probate Code section 150 provides:
(a) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if made after December 31, 1984, can be
established only by one of the following:
(1) Provisions of a will stating material provisions of a contract.
(2) An express reference in a will to the contract and extrinsic
evidence proving the terms of the contract.
(3) A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
(b) The execution of a joint will or mutual will does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.
(c) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if made on or before December 31, 1984,
can be established only under the law applicable to the contract on
December 31, 1984.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (West 1998).

4. CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a) (West 1998). Prior to the enactment of section 150, a contract to make or not to revoke a will was required to be in writing
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Because will contracts have been subject to the statute of
frauds even before the enactment of section 150,' the contract
law doctrine of equitable estoppel is available "under certain
unusual circumstances, in order to avoid unconscionable injury to one party and unjust enrichment to the other.. .. "6
Moreover, in Juran v. Epstein,7 the court specifically rejected
the argument that section 150 stood for the proposition that
equitable estoppel did not apply to contracts to make or not
to revoke a will.8 However, it is difficult to invoke estoppel in
the will contract arena because there is a significant burden
on "the plaintiff to prove the oral agreement and the elements of the estoppel by full, clear and convincing evidence."
Because equitable estoppel operates as an exception to
section 150's requirement that will contracts be in writing,
courts faced with this issue are required to engage in a balancing of interests. The need to protect the plaintiff from unconscionable injury must be weighed against the interest in
satisfying the statutory intent of Probate Code section 150.
In striking this balance of interests, the reviewing court
must, to the extent possible, adhere to the general principle
in the law of wills that testator intent controls the interpretation of the instrument. °
This comment develops the argument that recent decisions in the California courts have been too willing to apply
the estoppel doctrine, concluding that plaintiffs have suffered
unconscionable injuries. In this effort to protect plaintiffs,
the unfortunate consequence has been to restrict the extent
to which the will controls the disposition of the testator's
property. First, the background section traces California juunder subdivision 6 of California Civil Code section 1624. Notten v. Mensing,
45 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Cal. 1935).
5. See Notten, 45 P.2d at 199-200. See also cases cited infra note 6. "One
court has characterized the succession statute as 'a mini-statute of frauds."'
Brody v. Bock, 897 P.2d 769, 774 (Colo. 1995) (quoting In re Estate of Moore,
669 P.2d 609, 612 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)).
6. Di Salvo v. Bank of California, 78 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840 (Ct. App. 1969);
see also McCabe v. Healy, 70 P. 1008 (Cal. 1902) ("Courts of equity will, under
special circumstances, enforce a contract to make a will or to make a certain
testamentary disposition.").
7. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588 (Ct. App. 1994).
8. Juran v. Epstein, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588, 594-95 (Ct. App. 1994).
9. Di Salvo, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
10. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102(a) (West 1998).

11. See discussion infra Part IV.
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dicial history in this area of law. 2 Second, the analysis section explains the diminishing effects that recent court decisions have had on testator intent and examines the approaches taken by other jurisdictions in interpreting will
contract statutes." Finally, this comment proposes a solution
suggesting that a sufficient remedy can be found simply by
giving increased weight to the legislative purpose of section
150.14
II. BACKGROUND
A will is an instrument that provides instructions for the
distribution of a person's real and personal property upon her
death." It is said that a will speaks only at the time of the
testator's death, 6 meaning that it operates upon the circumstances as they exist at that time. Because the will becomes
the voice of the testator on her death, it is of primary importance that the "intention of the [testator] as expressed in the
instrument controls17 the legal effect of the dispositions made
in the instrument."
Throughout one's lifetime, however, it is common to
make changes to one's will through the execution of amendments and codicils. 8 By its nature, a will is said to be ambulatory until the death of the testator, meaning that the testator remains free to alter or revoke her will at any time
prior to death and without notice."' Therefore, a will has no
legal effect until the death of the testator,"° and as a result,
persons named in a will do not acquire any rights as beneficiaries until the testator's death. However, because a will contract either requires the testator to make a particular testamentary disposition of her property or prevents her from
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. See discussion infra Part V.
15. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Id.
17. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added). See also
supra text accompanying note 10.
18. A codicil is "[a] supplement or an addition to a will; it may explain,
modify, add to, subtract from, qualify, alter, restrain or revoke provisions in
[an] existing will." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 258 (6th ed. 1990).
19. See

PAUL
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ADMINISTRATION 57 (1987).
20. Id.
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revoking or modifying her existing will,2 the will loses its
ambulatory nature at the time the contract is executed. Consequently, the people named in a valid contractual will acquire rights as beneficiaries before the testator dies.
A. Types of Will Contracts:Contracts to Make Wills and
ContractsNot to Revoke Wills
There are two types of contracts that eliminate a will's
ambulatory nature: (1) the contract to make a will and (2) the
contract not to revoke an existing will.22 The contract to
make a will is most commonly utilized in situations where
the testator promises to make a particular testamentary disposition in favor of a third person in consideration for services rendered by that person.23 Contracts to make wills are
most commonly breached when the testator, for whatever
reason, fails to include the promised provision in her will.24
When a will contract is breached, the standard remedy in
California is the judicial imposition of a constructive trust.2 5
The constructive trust is a remedy in equity and seeks to restore to the plaintiff the property of the decedent's estate,
which served as the consideration for the services rendered.26
Slightly different in purpose and effect is the contract not
to revoke an existing will.2 7 The parties to this type of will
contract are usually husband and wife, 28 and the argument
that a will contract existed is typically based on the spouses'
execution of joint or mutual wills containing reciprocal provisions.29 In this type of will contract, each spouse promises to
21. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a) (West 1998). See also In re Estate of
Watson, 223 Cal. Rptr. 14, 16 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Redke v. Silvertrust, 490
P.2d 805, 808 (Cal. 1971)).
22. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 307 (5th ed. 1995).
23. See, e.g., Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996)
(involving an elderly widow who allegedly promised to leave her home to her
neighbors in exchange for their promise to care for her and her cats).
24. See, e.g., Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997) (involving a testator and his son, the alleged contractual beneficiary, who got into
a fight after the contract was made, resulting in the filing of that case when the
testator subsequently wrote his son out of his will).
25. See, e.g., Watson, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
26. Id.
27. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON supra note 22, at 305-07.
28. Id. at 306.
29. See Daniels v. Bridges, 267 P.2d 343, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
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leave his or her estate or a specified portion thereof if the
wills so provide, to the surviving spouse, who then has the
right to use as much of the income and principal as desired."
In consideration for this promise," the surviving spouse
agrees to dispose of the residue of the estate, or a portion
thereof if the provisions of the wills so provide, in a manner
agreed upon by the two spouses at the time the wills are executed.3" Because a contract is formed in this "promise-forpromise" arrangement, any action by the surviving spouse
that revokes or in any way alters the dispositive provisions of
the original wills constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise
to an estoppel claim and, therefore, the constructive trust
remedy.3 3
B. Enforceability of Will Contracts in General
California common law has a long history of recognizing
the right of a person to enter into a contract to make a particular testamentary disposition.34 It was not until 1983,
A joint will is a single testamentary instrument constituting or conMutual wills are the
taining the wills of two or more persons ....
separate wills of two or more persons which are reciprocal in their provisions .... A joint and mutual will is one instrument executed jointly
by two or more persons, the provisions of which are reciprocal.
Unlike the contract to make a will, which obligates the testator to make a
specific disposition of property after the execution of the contract, a contract
not to revoke a will is typically contained in the text of the joint will or mutual
wills. It is important, however, that "[t]he execution of a joint will or mutual
will does not create the presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or
wills." CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(b) (West 1998).
30. See Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of
Cates, 93 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Ct. App. 1971).
31. Although the contract itself is made at a time when it is uncertain who
the surviving spouse will be, the promise to make specific distributions at the
second death operates as consideration for a real promise. It is important to
remember that the promise to leave the estate to the surviving spouse, not the
actual receipt of the estate by the surviving spouse, is what gives rise to the
need for consideration.
32. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 306-07.
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Litigation concerning the
contract not to revoke or modify a will occurs most commonly when the surviving spouse, who is then the owner of the entire estate, revokes by executing a
new will that provides for a different distribution of the estate on the survivor's
death. See, e.g., Thompson v. Boyd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1963). Here,
the beneficiaries of the allegedly contractual will, as third party beneficiaries,
file the breach of contract claim seeking the constructive trust remedy. See,
e.g., Van Houten v. Whittaker, 337 P.2d 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
34. See Morrison v. Land, 147 P. 259 (Cal. 1915).
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however, that the right to enter into such a contract was codified by the California legislature. 5 Probate Code section 150
specifies that a contract to make a will is enforceable only
when: (1) the will contains the material provisions of the contract; 6 (2) the will makes an express reference to the contract;"7 or (3) there is "a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract."38 Under section 150, a contract to
make a will is enforceable only if it is in writing," thus making will contracts subject to the statute of frauds.4 ° Because
section 150 "was derived from and is substantially identical
to Uniform Probate Code section 2-514,"'41 an examination of
the purpose behind section 2-514 is instructive in determining the legislative intent behind California Probate Code section 150.
A significant problem with will contracts relates to the
fact that joint or mutual wills typically contain reciprocal
provisions. 42 The identical nature of the dispositions seems to
indicate that the parties to the will, most often husband and
wife, entered into an agreement as to how their property will
be distributed upon each of their deaths.43 While some states
presume that wills containing reciprocal provisions are contractual as a matter of law, California shares the majority
view that the "execution of a joint will or mutual will[s] does
not create the presumption of a contract not to revoke the
will or wills."45 Rather, "a contract not to revoke is not enforceable unless it is proved by clear and convincing evidence." 46 Before the Uniform Probate Code handed down its

recommendation as to how a will contract may properly be

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (West 1998).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a)(1) (West 1998).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a)(2) (West 1998).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a)(3) (West 1998).
See generally CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a) (West 1998).

40. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624 (West 1998).

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Juran v. Epstein, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588, 594 n.5 (Ct. App. 1994).
See supra note 29.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 307.
See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(b) (West 1998). See also COLO. PROB.
CODE § 15-11-514 (West 1998); 18-A ME. REV. ST. ANN. § 2-701 (West 1998);
NEB. REV. ST. § 30-2351 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. 3A:2A-19 (West 1998);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-13 West 1998).
46. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 307.
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proved,4 ' most jurisdictions, including California, were satisfied that the proper test for proving a will contract was the
clear and convincing standard.4 8 The contract itself did not
have to be in writing,49 and the court would consider extrinsic
evidence in determining whether a contract existed." Such
evidence could include the language of the will itself and the
factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the will
in determining whether a will was made pursuant to a contract.5
Before California's adoption of Probate Code section 150,
California courts never expressly required that will contracts
be in writing." However, the California Supreme Court, in
Notten v. Mensing," stated clearly that "since 1905, agreements [to leave property by will or not to revoke a will], under the provisions of the statute of frauds ... must be in
writing."54 In DeMattos v. McGovern,5 5 the plaintiff, alleging
that a decedent breached an oral contract to leave plaintiff
one-third of his estate in exchange for services rendered,
sought to have a constructive trust imposed on that portion of
the estate.56 In refusing to impose the constructive trust, the
court of appeal stated that under "section 1624 of the Civil
Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an
agreement to make a will, or 7to leave property by deed or will
is invalid unless in writing."
Although California courts interpreted the clear and convincing standard to require will contracts to comply with the
statute of frauds, other jurisdictions were more easily persuaded to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the
5 the Texas Civil Appeals Court
claimant. In Fisherv. Capp,"
found that a contract to make a will existed solely on the
47. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 (1969).
48. See Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450 (Cal. 1928); see also DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 307.
49. See, e.g., Notten v. Mensing, 45 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1935).
50. See, e.g., Lich v. Carlin, 7 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1960).
51. Id. at 559.
52. See, e.g., Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450 (Cal. 1928).
53. 45 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1935).
54. Id. at 200.
55. 77 P.2d 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
56. Id. at 523.
57. Id.
58. 597 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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ground that the parties executed a joint and mutual will. 9 In
Fisher, the court had no extrinsic evidence on which it could
rely in determining whether a contract existed by the clear
and convincing standard." However, under Texas law, a
joint will is contractual as a matter of law when the language
of the will demonstrates "that the testators jointly planned
the ultimate disposition of their combined estates in a manner evidencing an intent that the survivor would carry out
the ultimate disposition without alteration.""' Therefore, unlike California,62 Texas courts presume the existence of a contract from the testator's execution of a joint and mutual will,
even in the absence of any other evidence of a contract.63
The fact that many courts were inclined to presume a
contract from a joint will made it quite easy for plaintiffs to
successfully have constructive trusts imposed on decedents'
estates.64 Consequently, the door was opened to widespread
litigation, which led to the drafting of Uniform Probate Code
section 2-514.65 Section 2-514 served as a suggestion to states

to adopt statutes requiring will contracts to be in writing in
order to reduce will contract litigation.6 The last sentence of
59. The Texas Supreme Court's definition of "mutual will" specifically indicated the presumption that mutual wills were contractual as a matter of law.
"'Mutual wills' have been defined as wills executed pursuant to an agreement
between two or more persons to dispose of their property in a particular manner, each in consideration of the other." Dickerson v. Yarborough, 212 S.W.2d
975, 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
60. Fisher v. Capp, 597 S.W.2d 393, 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
61. Id. at 399.
62. See, e.g., Daniels v. Bridges, 267 P.2d 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
63. Fisher,597 S.W.2d at 399; see also Helms v. Darmstatter, 215 N.E.2d
245, 248-49 (Ill. 1966) (reasoning that a joint will executed by a husband and
wife gives rise to a presumption that the will is contractual when the will first
provides that the surviving spouse is to receive the decedent's estate and then
provides that, on the survivor's death, the estate is to be distributed equally between the families of each testator).
64. "The difficulty, however, is that the existence of a common dispositive
scheme ... in a jointly executed instrument strongly suggests an understanding or underlying agreement and thus invites a claim of contract ......
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 307.

65. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 cmt. (1969) ("Oral contracts not to revoke
wills have given rise to much litigation in a number of states; and in many
states, if two persons execute a single document as their joint will, this gives
rise to a presumption that the parties had contracted not to revoke the will.").
66. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 (1969)
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or
to die intestate ... may be established only by (i) provisions of the will
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2-514 specifically repudiates the presumption that a will contract exists as a result of the creation of a joint or mutual
will,6" thereby making it clear that "the purpose of this section is to tighten the methods by which contracts concerning
succession may be proved."68 The California Legislature's enactment of section 150 is in exact accordance with 2-514"9 and
demonstrates the legislature's intent to adopt the policy of
the Uniform State Law Commission" by requiring all will
contracts to be evidenced by a writing.7 1
C. Enforceabilityof Oral Contracts to Make a Will
This comment has already articulated the California
view that the "mere fact that a joint will contains reciprocal,
or similar or identical, [sic] provisions is not of itself sufficient evidence of a contract, nor is it enough to establish a legal obligation to forbear revocation in the absence of a valid
contract." 2 Furthermore, since 1905, it has been the general
rule in California that "oral agreements to leave property by
will, or not to revoke a will already made, are unenforceable."7 3 However, although Probate Code section 150 places
will contracts within the statute of frauds,7 4 "a party will be
estopped from relying on the statute where fraud would result from refusal to enforce an oral contract."75 Therefore, in
the case of an oral will contract, a party can maintain an action for imposition of a constructive trust only if he can: (1)
prove that a contract existed by offering clear and convincing
evidence of the testator(s) intent to be bound by the terms of
stating material provisions of the contract, (ii) an express reference in
a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract, or (iii) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 (1969).
67. Id. ("The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.").
68. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 cmt. (1969).
69. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text.
72. Daniels v. Bridges, 267 P.2d 343, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
73. Notten v. Mensing, 45 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1935) (citing Luders v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 9 P.2d 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Cazaurang v. Carrey, 4
P.2d 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(6) (West 1998).
75. Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 632 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Day
v. Green, 380 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1963)).
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the alleged agreement;"6 and (2) demonstrate that equitable
estoppel is applicable" by showing that failure to enforce the
contract would either result in unconscionable injury to a
party who has seriously changed her position in reliance on
the contract, or would unjustly enrich a party if the statute
were permitted as a defense."
Because the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show
the oral agreement by clear and convincing evidence,79 California courts have generally been hesitant to enforce oral will
contracts. In Shive v. Barrow, ° the plaintiffs alleged that the
testator made a will pursuant to an oral agreement in which
the plaintiffs would provide the testator with money and
services for the purpose of making capital improvements to
the testator's house.8' In exchange, the testator would first
leave the property to her surviving spouse, and on the death
of the surviving spouse, the plaintiffs would become the owners. 82 After the testator died, however, the surviving spouse
remarried and executed a new will83 leaving the house to his
new wife.8" The plaintiffs sought to have a constructive trust
imposed on the house, alleging that their performance of the
contract between them and the decedent entitled them to
ownership of the house. "
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the will was contractual, the court focused on the nature of the remedy
sought. The court said that since the plaintiffs sought par-

76. See Notten v. Mensing, 67 P.2d 734, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937). (interpreting the California Civil Code to require will contracts to be certain and
definite, founded upon an adequate consideration, and established by the clearest and most convincing evidence).
77. In Juran v. Epstein, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588 (Ct. App. 1994), the California
Court of Appeal concluded that the contract doctrine of equitable estoppel may
apply to will contracts notwithstanding Probate Code section 150(a). See also
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
78. See Redke v. Silvertrust, 490 P.2d 805, 809 (Cal. 1971).
79. See Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1928).
80. 199 P.2d 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
81. Shive v. Barrow, 199 P.2d 693, 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
82. Id.
83. When a will is executed subsequent to a previously made will and the
terms of the two wills are inconsistent with each other, the California Probate
Code treats the prior will as having been revoked by the execution of the new
will. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6120(a) (West 1998).
84. Shive, 199 P.2d at 695.
85. Id. at 695-96.
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ticular enforcement of the alleged contract, "this action.., is
one which is referable to the subject of the specific perform87
ance86 for the principles of law applicable." The contract at
issue provided that the plaintiffs would agree "to 'advance
various sums of money as needed"' by the testator."" In applying section 3390, the court concluded that the language of
the alleged contract merely provided that the plaintiffs would
agree to advance money, not that they actually entered into
an agreement to advance the money.89 Furthermore, the contract never specified how much money was needed or actually
advanced.9" Consequently, the court declined to impose a
constructive trust on the property because the terms of the
alleged agreement were not sufficiently definite or certain as
to warrant specific performance under Civil Code section
3390. 9'
A subsequent California Supreme Court decision reinforced California's reluctance toward enforcing oral contracts
2
to make or not to revoke wills. In Halldin v. Usher," the testators executed a joint and mutual will which stated that on
the death of the first spouse the survivor was to take the
property in question;93 and on the survivor's death the Mag94
nolia Avenue property was to go to the testators' children.
However, after the first death, the survivor remarried and
sold the Magnolia Avenue property9" to a bona-fide purchaser.96 The plaintiff sought to have a constructive trust
86. In California, section 3390 of the Civil Code sets forth appropriate
situations where a party may be entitled to specific performance of a contract
and provides, in pertinent part: "The following obligations cannot be specifically
enforced: ... 5. An agreement, the terms of which are not sufficiently certain
to make the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertainable." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3390 (West 1998) (emphasis added).
87. Shive v. Barrow, 199 P.2d 693, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (quoting Reyburn v. Young, 54 P.2d 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 86.
92. 321 P.2d 746 (Cal. 1958).
93. See Halldin v. Usher, 321 P.2d 746, 747 (Cal. 1958). For purposes of
this case discussion, the property in question will hereinafter be referred to as
the "Magnolia Avenue" property.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 747-48.
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imposed, alleging that the joint and mutual will was contractual and, therefore, irrevocable.9 7
The question of whether the will in this case was contractual or testamentary was a question of fact.98 In rejecting
the plaintiffs contention that the will was contractual,99 the
California Supreme Court concluded that "there was substantial and admissible parol evidence to the effect that the
instrument was to be effective only at death and that it was
intended to be a will [and not a contract]. " "' Therefore, under the Halldin decision, an oral will contract is not enforceable unless the plaintiff shows that the testator "clear[ly] and
unambiguous[ly] intended to be bound by the provisions of
the will."''
Through an examination of California judicial history
concerning the enforceability of oral will contracts, it becomes
clear that a plaintiff alleging breach of such a contract would
have a difficult time proving that the contract existed.'0 2 This
is not to say, however, that California does not recognize the
oral contract to make a will altogether; in some cases, the
will itself provides satisfactory evidence of a contract." 3 In
VanHouten v. Whitaker,1 0 4 the court determined that the particular language used in a joint will 0 ' was sufficient to evidence the fact that the testators intended to be bound by its
provisions.0 6 However, recent California decisions' °7 appear
to have made the clear and convincing standard significantly

97. Id. To rebut the plaintiffs contention, defendants offered parol evidence that the testators had no intention of being bound by the will at the time
of its execution. Under this view, the will would speak only on the death of the
testator. Id.
98. See id. (citing Michels v. Olmstead, 157 U.S. 198 (1895)).
99. Halldin v. Usher, 321 P.2d 746, 747 (Cal. 1958).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See discussion supra Part II.C.
103. See, e.g., Mintz v. Rowitz, 91 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1970).
104. 337 P.2d 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
105. Van Houten v. Whitaker, 337 P.2d 900, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). The
will, in pertinent part, provided: "Both of us agree that upon the death of the
last one of us the estate remaining shall be divided in half ...." Id.
106. Id. at 904.
107. See, e.g., Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997); Byrne
v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1997); Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996).
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more plaintiff-friendly. 8 Before examining the cases that
have most significantly contributed to this judicial evolution,
some background on the interplay between will contracts and
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is necessary."'
D. Oral Will Contracts and Equitable Estoppel
It is important to always keep in mind that proving the
0
existence of an oral will contract is only half the battle;" to
be entitled to the remedy of a constructive trust, the plaintiff
must also demonstrate that an unconscionable injury would
befall the plaintiff if the statute of frauds were invoked."'
Many cases involving the enforceability of an oral promise to make or not to revoke a will have a common factual
situation: the surviving spouse, after having received a substantial benefit by inheriting the decedent's estate, revokes
Even before Probate Code section
the joint or mutual will.'
150 placed will contracts within the statute of frauds, "California courts have long applied equitable principles to enforce
an oral promise not to revoke a mutual will where the survi3
vor accepts benefits under the decedent's will."" If the beneficiaries under the newly executed will were allowed to invoke the statute of frauds, the "remedy [of a constructive
trust] presumes that a constructive fraud has been practiced
on the first decedent by the second decedent to the detriment
of the original beneficiaries ....,11 Moreover, the beneficiaries of the new will take benefits to which they would not be
entitled if the statute of frauds were not available."' Assuming that an oral contract not to revoke or modify a will
exists, courts will use estoppel to enforce the contract in
situations where the will is revoked or materially modified by
a party to the contract who has received a benefit under the
terms of the contract. 116
108. See discussion infra Part II.E.
109. See discussion infra Part II.D.
110. See discussion supra Part I.C.
111. See supra text accompanying note 9.
112. This factual scenario is described as "classic." Mintz v. Rowitz, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 435, 439 (Ct. App. 1970).
113. Juran v. Epstein, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1994).
114. Stahmer v. Schley, 157 Cal. Rptr. 756, 758 (Ct. App. 1979).
115. Id.
116. Id. The party referred to is typically the surviving spouse.
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This presumption seems to indicate that once a plaintiff
establishes the existence of an oral contract to make a will it
is less difficult to convince a court that the defendant should
be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds. However,
consistent with California's general reluctance to enforce oral
will contracts," 7 courts carefully consider whether equitable
estoppel is appropriate in a given case, even after the contract is found to exist. 118
In determining whether an unconscionable injury has occurred, courts place primary importance on examining
whether the perpetrator of the fraud has received a substantial benefit."9 In Rolls v. Allen,' the court denied imposition
of a constructive trust because the plaintiffs had not proven
the existence of a contract. 12 1 However, the California Supreme Court noted that even if a contract had been proven, a
constructive trust would have been improper because the
value of the estate was so minimal1 22 that plaintiffs could not
have shown that they had been prejudiced.'
Moreover, the
court emphasized the importance of the nominal value of the
estate in its unconscionable injury determination when it
said that "[a] different situation might be presented in a case
where ... a survivor received 1 certain
substantial benefits
4
which he retained and enjoyed."
For purposes of determining whether there had been an
unconscionable injury, the California Court of Appeal, in

117. As discussed above, plaintiffs more difficult task is in bringing sufficient evidence that a will contract exists. See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
118. See discussion infra Part II.D.
119. "The contracting party who survives becomes estopped from making
any other or different disposition of the property ... at least where he avails
himself of the provisions of the decedent's will in his favor and accepts substantial benefits thereunder." VanHouten v. Whitaker, 337 P.2d 900, 903 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959) (quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (Cal. 1949)
(emphasis added)).
120. 269 P. 450 (Cal. 1928).
121. Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1928).
122. Id. The dispute in this case was over the income from the estate. The
estate itself was described by the court as "modest" and, under the facts, the
value to the plaintiffs would have been diminished further because the surviving spouse would have been entitled to one-half of the income from her share of
the community property, a family allowance, and a homestead. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
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Mintz v. Rowitz,'12' began to place less importance on the
value of the estate sought to be held in constructive trust. In
that case, a husband and wife had executed reciprocal wills,
along with a written agreement not to revoke or alter the
wills 2 ' unless both testators provided written consent. 127 In
arguing that equitable estoppel should apply, the defendant
claimed that the surviving spouse did not suffer an unconscionable injury because the surviving spouse never received
any benefits from the decedent's estate.' 21 However, the court
made it clear that an unconscionable injury may be established either by a demonstration of prejudice or on a showing
of unjust enrichment. 29 Since the surviving spouse did have
control of the estate,' he could not make alternate distributions of the property; therefore the beneficiaries under the altered provisions of the will were deemed to have been unjustly enriched."'
2

E. Recent CaliforniaLitigation Concerning Will Contracts'
As alluded to above,'33 California courts are less hesitant
than they once were to impose constructive trusts on property sought to be claimed on grounds that there was an operative contract to make or not to revoke a will. In Estate of
Brenzikofer,' plaintiffs claimed that they had an oral
agreement with the decedent, Elnora Brenzikofer, whereby
the plaintiffs would provide care for her and her cats in exchange for Elnora's promise to will them the house that

125. 91 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1970).
126. Therefore, there was no doubt that a will contract did in fact exist. The
only issue in this case was that of estoppel. Mintz v. Rowitz, 91 Cal. Rptr. 435,
438 (Ct. App. 1970).
127. Id. at 437.
128. Id. at 440. The court rejected this argument because many of the decedent's assets were not subject to probate administration. Even though the surviving spouse did not receive the assets in the estate pursuant to a formal administration procedure, he did possess and control the assets. In the court's
view, therefore, he did receive a benefit. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 128.
131. Mintz v. Rowitz, 91 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1970).
132. See DAVID LANE, SELECTED RECENT
PLANNING & PROBATE 9-14 (1997).

133. See discussion supra Part II.C.
134. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996).
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plaintiffs were renting from her.'35 After Elnora died, however, her will contained no such devise.'3 6 The plaintiffs, alleging an oral contract existed, brought this action seeking
imposition of a constructive trust on the house."7
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Estate,'3 8 but the appellate court reversed and remanded "on the
issue of whether a constructive trust was created by the oral
representations of the decedent... ."1" In holding that "the
trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment,"4 ° the court pointed to testimony offered in support of
plaintiffs' claim that a contract existed.'
Such testimony led
to the court's conclusion that "an oral agreement could provide sufficient basis for 'an action for quasi-specific performance based on oral representations." 42
The appellate court's decision in Byrne v. Laura,' represented a significant departure from the precedent established
in Shive v. Barrow.' In Shive, the court held that plaintiffs
were not entitled to specific performance of the alleged contract because its terms were not definite and certain. 4' The
court in Byrne, however, ruled that a will contract with uncertain terms was enforceable because of a modern trend
which favors holding promises enforceable despite uncer-

135. Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1996). The
parties stipulated that Elnora "made this sentiment known to the plaintiffs'
relatives and neighbors." Id.
136. It is not clear from a reading of the facts whether Elnora simply forgot
to include the devise in her will, whether that provision was intentionally omitted from her will, or whether the provision was first included in her will and
later removed pursuant to a change of Elnora's intentions. Id.
137. Id. at 402.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 406.
140. Id. at 405.
141. A neighbor of both plaintiffs and decedent testified that "[decedent]
stated to us that, in her will, the house [in which plaintiffs] were living was
going to be for them." Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 405 (Ct. App.
1996). Also, the daughter-in-law of one of the plaintiffs testified that "[o]n
many occasions, [decedent] stated to us that she would will the house the
[plaintiffs] lived in to them." Id.
142. LANE, supra note 132, at 9 (quoting Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
405).
143. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1997).
144. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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tainty as to its terms."'
Byrne involved an alleged oral contract between Skip and
Flo, who "cohabitated... as husband and wife."14 ' When
Skip died on June 29, 1993,148 he left an estate worth approximately $1.2 million.14 He had allegedly promised Flo
that all of their property would be mutually owned, and upon
the death of the first of them, the survivor would become the
sole owner of all the remaining property.'
Flo claimed that
they had an oral contract providing that Skip would take care
of her for the rest of her life in exchange for domestic services.151 Evidencing the contract were Skip's assurances to her
that "she did not have to worry because he would take care of
her and she would 'have a roof over her head.""' 2 Flow also
maintained that "a week before [his unexpected death],"'
[Skip] reiterated to her that he was going to put all his property into a living trust for her benefit."'5 4
The estate argued that the promise was not enforceable
because the contract did not comply with the writing requirement of Probate Code section 150."' However, the court
held that section 150 was inapplicable because "[an agreement for support, even for a lifetime, is by its terms neither a
'contract to make a will' nor a contract to make a 'devise ....""" Moreover, the court held that due to Flow's actions in reliance on Skip's promises, there was a material issue of fact as to whether equitable estoppel should be invoked
in this case." '
California courts seemed to depart further from their
reluctance to enforce oral will contracts with the decision in

146. Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 915 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Hennefer v. Butcher, 227 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322 (Ct. App. 1986)).
147. Id.at 912.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.at 911.
152. Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 912 (Ct. App. 1997). Skip also
made repeated promises to Flo that "everything he had was [hers] and would
someday belong to her." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 915.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 917-18.
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Estate of Housely."' In that case, the California Court of Appeal found a triable issue of fact as to whether a testator executed a contractual will in exchange for personal care services provided by his son.1"9 The plaintiff, Brian Housely, lived
with his father, John, for almost thirty years, 6 ' "only because
[John] asked for and needed [Brian's] help, and there was no
one else to take care of him."'' John felt free to ask Brian for
help with various matters and frequently said that Brian
should help him because "he was going to leave everything to
Brian in his will."'62 Although they shared living expenses for
most of the time they lived together, once John retired, Brian
assumed the costs of living for the both of them with the exception of property taxes, which John continued to pay. '
Brian filed an action seeking imposition of a constructive
trust when he discovered, after John had committed suicide,'64 that John had written Brian out of his will and removed him as a beneficiary of John's trust.'65
The appellate court was satisfied that John's repeated
demands for Brian's assistance in exchange for Brian's inclusion in John's will created a material fact as to whether an
agreement was formed.' Furthermore, in reversing the trial
court's order of summary judgment, the appellate court cited
Juran v. Epstein'67 for the proposition that "section 150 does
not preclude the application of equitable estoppel principles
to enforce an oral agreement made post 1984 to make or not
to revoke a will." 66 The court, citing Witkin, stated that
"'considerations of policy indicate a restricted application of
the statute of frauds if not its total abolition."" 9 Brian's ten158. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997).
159. Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 630 (Ct. App. 1997).
160. Id. Brian lived with John continuously from 1959 to 1989 except for a
three-year period during which Brian served in the military. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1997). Brian and
John had a serious dispute on or about April 1, 1994 in which "John told Brian
to stay away from him and threatened to shoot Brian." Id.
166. Id. at 632.
167. See supra note 7.
168. Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633 (citing Juran v. Epstein, 28 Cal. Rptr.
2d 588, 594-95 (Ct. App. 1994)).
169. Id. (citing 1 WITKIN, CONTRACTS § 261, at 259 (9th ed. 1987)).
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ure of service to his father, along with his acts of assuming
most of John's living expenses was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the estate should be estopped
from asserting the statute of frauds.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
There is no question that recent California cases"' ° concerning the enforceability of contracts to make or not to revoke a will have correctly determined that, if defendants
were permitted to assert the statute of frauds defense, plaintiffs would have suffered an unconscionable injury. Testimony and other extrinsic evidence presented in these cases
demonstrate clearly that the plaintiffs materially altered
their positions in reliance on the testators' promises: (1) they
provided many years of service for the testators;.'. (2) did not
accept opportunities elsewhere by residing with or near the
testator;' 2 and (3) made significant financial contributions
toward the testators' care." 3 Such evidence is undeniably indicative of unconscionable injury to plaintiffs if the promises
on which they relied were not fulfilled.
The legal problem arises, however, not in the court's
method of applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, but in
the decision of whether or not to apply the doctrine at all.
Under California law, the fact that a plaintiff has suffered an
unconscionable injury in reliance upon a testator's promise to
devise property does not entitle the plaintiff to the imposition
of a constructive trust unless the court first finds that a contract to devise the property existed.' 4 As discussed in the
previous section, for purposes of finding a contract, "the burden is on the plaintiff to show the oral contracts by clear and

170. For purposes of Parts III and IV, the phrase "recent California cases"
refers to Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997); Byrne v.
Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1996); and Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996). See also supra note 132.
171. See, e.g., Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403; Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 630.
172. See, e.g., Byrne, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917; Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
405.
173. See discussion supra Part II.E.
174. An agreement to make or not to revoke a will, is a condition precedent
to the maintenance of an action seeking imposition of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. Van Houten v. Whitaker, 337 P.2d 900, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).

1206

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

convincing evidence."' 5
In recent California litigation on this subject, courts have
misapplied this two-pronged test by imposing a constructive
trust before finding that a contract existed. Thus, the remedy is granted before evaluating the propriety of the plaintiffs legal theory.'7 6 This practice of putting the cart before
the horse relieves the plaintiff from the burden of producing
evidence of the contract which satisfies the rigorous clear and
convincing standard, clearly the more difficult part of a plaintiffs will contract case.'
IV. ANALYSIS
The factual scenarios arising in will contract litigation
are of two main types. The "classic" situation, ' involving a
surviving spouse's breach of an alleged contract not to revoke
an existing will, is representative of much of California's judicial history on this subject.' 9 The other common situation
arises when a party who has rendered services in reliance on
a promise of a particular testamentary disposition discovers
that, after the death of the testator, the will contained no
such devise.8 ° Because there is little variance in the facts
surrounding will contract litigation, there is little room for
courts to make factual distinctions between cases. Therefore,
the question comes down to one of adherence to Probate Code
section 150. Recent decisions by California courts, however,
demonstrate an unwarranted departure from the statutory
authority.
A. Loose Application of EquitableEstoppel Undermines the
Statutory Importance of Testator Intent
In the interest of protecting persons who rely on oral
promises to make wills, courts have lost sight of the fact that
175. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
176. See discussion infra Part IV.A.

177. See supra note 170. In recent California cases, the plaintiffs all provided evidence of unconscionable injury.
178. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
179. See Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450 (Cal. 1928); VanHouten v. Whitaker, 337
P.2d 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Shive v. Barrow, 199 P.2d 693 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948).

180. See Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (Ct. App. 1997)Estate of
Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401 (Ct. App. 1996).
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California law places primary importance on giving legal efBecause the doctrine of
fect to the intent of the testator.'
equitable estoppel has its origin in contract law, not in the
law of wills,"' there is an element present in will contracts
that does not surface in most other types of contracts. Unlike
many other agreements to which equitable estoppel was
originally designed to apply,'83 litigation as to the existence of
contractual wills does not often surface until the testator has
died. Therefore, one of the parties to the contract is almost
always unavailable to testify as to what was intended when
the parties allegedly entered into a contract. Because the
testator is unavailable to present his interpretation of the
events giving rise to the litigation, the Probate Code emphatically protects his intent directly through rules of construction.'
This is not to say that the doctrine of estoppel
should not ever apply to will contract litigation,'8 5 but there is
the special danger in dealing with will contracts that an unwarranted application of estoppel will prevent the instrument from carrying out the intent of the testator.'86 The
situation in Estate of Housely illustrates clearly how the unwarranted application of87 equitable estoppel erodes the importance of testator intent.'
In Housely, it was clear that John intended at one point
This
in his life to leave his entire estate to his son, Brian.'
being John's intent at that time, the Probate Code afforded
him the opportunity to execute a controlling instrument providing for that disposition after his death. 9 However, it is
also quite clear that, during his life, John changed his mind
and no longer wanted to devise any property to Brian because

181. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102(a) (West 1998).
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1978).

183. It was not until 1994, eleven years after the enactment of section 150,
that California specifically held that equitable estoppel did apply to will contracts. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
184. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21102(a), 21120 (West 1998).
185. See supra note 6.

186. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
187. See discussion supra Part II.E.
188. There is no evidence in the case that Brian ever coerced John into
naming him as the beneficiary of John's estate. Thus, it seems a proper assumption that naming Brian in the will was consistent with John's then existing testamentary intent.
189. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6100, 21105 (West 1998).
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of a serious quarrel they had.19 Therefore, John amended his
will to give legal effect to his intent to disinherit Brian.'
In holding that the constructive trust remedy may be appropriate, the Housely court set aside John's intention to exclude Brian from his will. More specifically, the court, with
full knowledge of John's testamentary intentions at the time
of his death, refused to give legal effect to those intentions,
despite the fact that they were clear and definite. It is difficult to imagine circumstances that represent a more serious
departure from the intent of the California Legislature. California Probate Code section 21102 (a) clearly states that "the
intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument."'92 In this situation, the intent of the testator was
abundantly clear, but even if John's final testamentary intent
was ambiguous, the court would have been controlled by
rules of construction requiring that legal effect be given to
every expression in the instrument. 193
Notwithstanding the principles of the law of wills cited
above,' the court held that a trier of fact could find that
there was sufficient evidence of a contract between John and
his son that had the effect of requiring John's estate to pass
to Brian.'
In support of its holding, the court relied on
John's statements that Brian should care for him because he
was going to leave everything to Brian in his will.'9
This
evidence, however, is of the same nature as that considered
in Daniels v. Bridges9 7 in which the court concluded that the
language relied upon was "purely testamentary in character;
[with] nothing to indicate ... contractual intent."'99 Rather,
it is more likely that John used the fact that Brian was to be
beneficiary of his estate as leverage for obligating Brian mor190. Estate of Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1997).
191. Id.
192. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
193. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21120 (West 1998).
194. See supra text accompanying note 192.
195. Housely, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
196. Id. at 638.
197. In Daniels, the plaintiff presented language in the will itself in an attempt to prove the existence of a contract. The will provided that after the
death of the two spouses, the estate was to pass to the plaintiff. Daniels v.
Bridges, 267 P.2d 343, 344-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
198. Id. at 346.
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ally to provide the care and services upon which John was
dependent. The language "because John was going to leave
Brian everything in his will,"'99 implies that, at the time the
statement was made, Brian was already named in the will.
Therefore, under a contract formation analysis, there was no
contract because Brian never bargained for his inclusion in
John's will. ' If the Housely court had followed California
precedent established in decisions such as Rolls and Daniels,
it would have affirmed the trial court's order of summary
judgment on the grounds that John's statements to Brian
0 1
were not "most indisputable evidence of [an] agreement."
Moreover, even if it were possible to interpret John's statement as contractual, it still would fail under the clear and
convincing test. 2 Without such clear and convincing evidence as required under California law, the instrument must
02
control the disposition of the testator's estate.
B. Failureto Strictly Apply Section 150 Invites a Flood of
Will ContractLitigation
As the test for enforcing oral will contracts developed
throughout California judicial history, the rigidity with which
courts denied equitable relief to plaintiffs began to erode in
the interest of protecting the person who relied on the promise.20 4 In early cases, courts refused to impose constructive
trusts absent clear and convincing evidence of the existence
of an oral will contract, even when they were satisfied that
2 5 Howthe plaintiff had suffered an unconscionable injury.
ever, as this issue became litigated more and more in the
California courts, the practice of granting equitable relief to
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
200. Because Brian was already included in the will at the time the statements was made, John's act of including Brian in his will is interpreted under
contract law to be nothing more than a past consideration for the care services
See
Consequently, the alleged contract was never formed.
provided.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1978).
201. Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1928).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id; cf. Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1997).
205. See, e.g., Daniels v. Bridges, 267 P.2d 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (holding
that a constructive trust was not available on the grounds that there was
nothing to indicate contractual intent, even though the surviving spouse accepted and enjoyed benefits from the decedent's estate).
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plaintiffs that had materially relied on a promise began to
win over the legal formality involved in proving the existence
of a contract by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.2"6
By relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving the most difficult part of their case,"' California courts opened wide the
doors of will contract litigation, which Probate Code section
150 sought to keep only ajar.0 8
In holding that there was a material issue of fact in Estate of Brenzikofer, °9 as to whether a contract existed, the
court relied on affidavits submitted by four non-party witnesses, each of whom had knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the litigation. 10 The affidavits conveyed the
general message that Elnora Brenzikofer was very dependent
on the plaintiffs and that it was her intention to leave her
house to the plaintiffs in her will.2 1'
A direct application of section 150 would have barred the
plaintiffs' claim because there was no writing to evidence the
contract. Moreover, under California precedent, this should
not have been enforced as an oral contract because none of
the language in any of the affidavits submitted indicated that
there was any agreement between the decedent and the
plaintiffs. Rather, the testimony in the affidavits was entirely testamentary, indicating only that the decedent, at one
identifiable time in her life, intended to leave her house to
the plaintiffs.212
Since there was nothing in the affidavits to suggest that
206. See Di Salvo v. Bank of California, 78 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1969) (focusing little attention on the question of whether there was, in fact, a legally
formed contract).
207. See supra note 117.
208. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 cmt. (1969). It is also important to remember that California's Probate Code section 150 is identical in substance to
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 (1969). See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
210. Plaintiff presented four affidavits from decedent's neighbor and his
wife, as well as affidavits from the son and daughter-in-law of one of the plaintiffs. Estate of Brenzikofer, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 405 (Ct. App. 1996).
211. Id.
212. The affidavits of Natividad Diaz and his wife, Otilla, neighbors of the
plaintiffs and decedent, state, in relevant part: "[Decedent] told us that she
didn't know what she would do without [plaintiffs]. She stated that [plaintiffs]
were like her hands and feet and that they did everything for her .... [Decedent] stated to us that in her will, the house [in which plaintiffs] were living
was going to be for them." Id.
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the decedent intended to be contractually bound by her
statements, there was little support to the claim that the
213
plaintiffs provided evidence of the most indisputable kind.
At the time Elnora made the statements contained in the affidavits, she probably did intend to will her house to the
plaintiffs. But the fact that she never actually made the devise suggests that, at the time of her death, it was not her intention to devise her property to the plaintiffs; Elnora simply
might have changed her mind.1 4 The California Probate
Code affords persons the right to change their wills at any
time.215 The courts cannot deny this right when the only evidence of a contract is statements made at one point in the
testator's life where she expressed her desire to leave the
plaintiffs her house. The court concluded that Elnora's act of
expressing her then existing intent to devise her house to
plaintiffs was sufficient to render her contractually bound to
leave her house to the plaintiffs. If the California Legislature
had wanted to make it this easy to form a will contract, it
would not have deliberately placed will contracts within the
ambit of the statute of frauds by enacting Probate Code section 150.216
Statutes governing the methods in which persons may
enter into contracts limiting their statutory right to revoke
their will, 21 7 or limiting their power to make testamentary

dispositions of their property,"8 have been enacted for the
purpose of reducing litigation in this area to only the most
valid of claims; claims where the plaintiff can produce a
writing evidencing the contract.219 Notwithstanding the narrow exception to this rule, which allows courts to enforce oral
eviwill contracts that are proved by clear and convincing
Housely2 1°
and
Brenzikofer
in
judgment
dence, summary

213. Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1928) (citing Edson v. Parsons, 50
N.E. 265 (N.Y. 1898)).
214. See supra note 136.
215. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102(a) (West 1998).
216. See supra note 3.
217. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6120 (West 1998).
218. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100 (West 1998).
219. CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a) (West 1998). See also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2514 cmt. (1969).
220. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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would have been affirmed because precedentl2 2 clearly indicates that the language relied upon by the Brenzikofer and
Housely courts was not sufficient to evidence a contract. As a
result, this type of reliance on an alleged promise to make a
testamentary disposition was not of the type intended to be
protected by California Probate Code section 150.22

Bren-

zikofer and Housely, therefore, are abuses of this narrow exception to the general rule that contracts to make or not to
revoke wills must be in writing to be enforceable. These decisions demonstrate the dangers in allowing the exception to
swallow the rule.
C. The ColoradoApproach: Guidance for the California
Courts
California is among the many jurisdictions that models
its statute governing will contracts after section 2-514 of the
Uniform Probate Code. 23 Because of the widespread adoption of section 2-514,224 courts in many jurisdictions have had

occasion to interpret and apply this language. Consequently,
there is a substantial body of law under which judicial interpretation of California's Probate Code section 150 may be
evaluated. More specifically, in Colorado,225 courts are less
inclined to set aside the language in a testator's will in the
interest of protecting the rights of third parties seeking constructive trust remedies.2

6

As a result, Colorado strikes a

221. See Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450 (Cal. 1928); Daniels v. Bridges, 267 P.2d
343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
222. This policy is fully articulated in UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 (1969).
223. See, e.g. COLO. PROB. CODE § 15-11-514 (West 1998); 18-A ME. REV. ST.
ANN. § 2-701 (West 1998); NEB. REV. ST. § 30-2351 (West 1998); N.J.
STAT.
ANN. 3A:2A-19 (West 1998).
224. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
225. Colorado Probate Code section 15-11-514 reads as follows:
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or
to die intestate, if executed after July 1, 1995, may be establishedonly
by: (i) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract,
(ii) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of the contract, or (iii) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual
wills does not create the presumption of a contract not to revoke the
will or wills. (emphasis added).
COLO. PROB. CODE § 15-11-514 (West 1998). Compare this language with that
of CAL. PROB. CODE § 150 (West 1998). See supra note 3.
226. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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more desirable balance between the competing interests of
giving legal effect to testator intent and equitable estoppel.
The case of Rieck v. Rieck227 illustrates this balance.
Rieck involved mutual and reciprocal wills that allegedly
required the surviving spouse to leave certain property to
plaintiffs and defendant's son.22 Following the death of the
decedent, and fearful that the surviving spouse would change
her will, plaintiffs sought to have the will declared irrevocable and nonmodifiable on grounds of the reciprocity and mutuality of the wills.22
In holding that the wills were fully revocable and modifiable,30 the court found no evidence of an oral or written contract.2 1 However, the will contract statute "is in the nature
of a statute of frauds."2 2 Thus, even if there was an oral contract not to revoke or modify the wills, such a contract still
would not have been enforced by the Rieck Court because it
was not in writing. 3' As compared to California's more liberal application of equitable estoppel, then, the Colorado approach weighs more heavily in favor of testator intent, placing emphasis on the fact that "[tlestators are charged with
knowledge of the statute in existence at the time when their
wills are made, and thus, any resulting inequities and not oc2 4
casioned by the law, but by their failure to adhere to it." "
As noted above, the Colorado approach is desirable because it gives adequate protection to the interests of the testator, while providing third parties the ability to successfully
bring an estoppel claim and obtain a constructive trust remedy in appropriate situations. One predominant appropriate
situation involves fraud. Under the Colorado approach, "the
statute of frauds should not be permitted to be an instrument

227. 724 P.2d 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
228. Rieck v. Rieck, 724 P.2d 674, 675 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 676.
232. Id. (citing In re Estate of Moore, 669 P.2d 609, 612 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
See also supra note 5.
233. Rieck v. Reick, 724 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). The Rieck court
makes special mention that "[elven if we assume the existence of an oral
agreement... application of the equitable principles of part performance is
unwarranted." Id.
234. Id. at 676-77 (emphasis added).
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of fraud."235 Thus, Colorado's section 15-11-514 will be set
aside if its enforcement would otherwise result in a bar of a
plaintiffs valid fraud claim.236
V. PROPOSAL

The above analysis has outlined the future dangers associated with excessively liberal application of the estoppel exception to Probate Code section 150's requirement that con-

tracts to make or not to revoke a will be in writing." In
order to ensure that the exception does not swallow the rule,
California courts should adopt the approach of the Colorado
courts, thus returning to a more strict application of section
150. Construing will contract claims directly in light of the
language and policy of section 150 will provide an assurance
that courts will equitably balance the protection afforded to
parties who detrimentally rely on a testator's promise, while
giving full legal effect to the intent of the testator.
Because joint and reciprocal wills, on their face, seem to
have been executed pursuant to an agreement, 23 8 equitable
estoppel became a powerful tool in undermining the validity
of the language in a will. In response, the drafters of the
California Probate Code enacted section 150 with the intention of making it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed on a
will contract claim. 239 Legislative and judicial history evidences the proposition that section 150 was not intended to
be trumped easily by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. An
examination of characteristics surrounding section 150 lends
support to this contention.
First, the statute is clear that contracts to make wills

235. Brody v. Bock, 897 P.2d 769, 774 (Colo. 1995) (citing Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 769-70 (Colo. 1983)).
236. Id. at 775. It is worthy of mention that other jurisdictions, including
the Ninth Circuit, have held the position that a fraud claim is not justification
for setting aside the statute of frauds. See Caplan v. Roberts, 506 F.2d 1039,
1041 (9th Cir. 1974). Given the Ninth Circuit's stringent interpretation of the
statute of frauds as articulated in Caplan, the appeal of Colorado's approach is
augmented by its ability to find that "middle ground" between protection of the
testator's interest and that of the third parties seeking the constructive trust
remedy.
237. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
238. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 307.
239. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-514 cmt. (1969).
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"can be established only by one of the following."24 ° Thereafter, section 150 lists three methods that are acceptable as a
means of proving a contract to make a will, all of which re4 1 Second,
quire some type of writing evidencing the contract.
judicial history, recognizing the need to apply equitable principles to will contracts in special situations, requires the
plaintiff to first establish the existence of the contract "by the
242 In the case of oral
clearest and most convincing evidence."
will contracts, however, the fact that the plaintiff is required
to meet a burden higher than that in most civil actions
clearly indicates judicial intent to allow will contracts to be
taken out of the statute of frauds only in circumstances
where it is obvious that a contract existed.
By following the Colorado approach,2 41 California courts
would not run the risk of barring the use of equitable estoppel in appropriate situations. Certainly, the language of the
will should be set aside where the testator never had any intention of making the devise in favor of the plaintiff. To allow such a fraud to be worked on a party who changed his
position in material reliance on the testator's promise would
unquestionably undermine the general principles of fairness,
and the Colorado courts have been careful to permit equitable
estoppel in such situations. 44 Nevertheless, absent intentional wrongdoing, estoppel is not available to set aside the
operative language of a valid will. 4 ' Colorado courts, therefore, apply the laws and policies that arise in oral will contract litigation to produce a fair balancing between the interests of the testator and those of third parties seeking the
Therefore, California courts
constructive trust remedy.
would be well-advised to re-examine their approach in light
of Colorado law on this subject.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is important to protect the interests of persons who
materially change their position in reliance on a contract.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

CAL. PROB. CODE § 150(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
See id.
See Rolls v. Allen, 269 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1928).
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
See Rieck v. Rieck, 724 P.2d 674, 675 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
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However, in most types of contracts, this protection is afforded because the opposing party can also explain the circumstances giving rise to the litigation in a way that suggests that neither party intended to enter into a contract.
When dealing with will contracts, however, this situation is
vastly different. In nearly all cases, the testator is deceased
at the time the action commences and cannot testify on his
own behalf as to the lack of contractual intent of the parties.
Since the will does not speak until death, it is presumed that
the testator's final intent is expressed in the language of the
will, which controls the method by which the testator's property is distributed on his death. 46 Given this clear statutory
importance of preserving testator intent, courts should be extremely careful in applying equitable estoppel in the context
of will contracts. Recent California decisions have invoked
this doctrine in inappropriate cases and the result has been
to silence the deceased, who can only speak through their
testamentary instruments. Therefore, a return to a more
narrow construction of Probate Code section 150 is necessary
to preserve the importance of testator intent.
Jeff G. Carchidi

246. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102(a) (West 1998).

